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LEGAL DILEMMAS FACING WHITE HOUSE 
COUNSEL IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION:  
THE COSTS OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 
OF FISA REQUESTS 
Peter Margulies* 
INTRODUCTION 
Not every presidential administration can forge a new brand of 
government lawyering.  Historically, government lawyering has swung 
between two poles:  (1) dialogic lawyering, which stresses reasoned 
elaboration, respect for institutions, and continuity with unwritten norms 
embodied in past practice; and (2) insular lawyering, which entails opaque 
definitions, disregard of other institutions, and departures from unwritten 
norms.1  Because President Trump regularly signals his disdain for 
institutions, such as the intelligence community, and unwritten norms, such 
as prosecutorial independence,2 senior lawyers in the White House have 
added a new mode of legal representation that entails ad hoc adjustments to 
President Trump’s mercurial decisions and triage among the presidential 
decisions they will try to temper.  Call it:  lifeboat lawyering. 
Lifeboat lawyering, as practiced by Donald F. McGahn II—the first White 
House Counsel of the Trump administration3—and others, involves 
 
*  Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.  B.A., Colgate University; 
J.D., Columbia Law School.  I thank Bob Bauer and participants at the Fordham Law Review 
Colloquium on The Varied Roles, Regulation, and Professional Responsibility of Government 
Lawyers for comments on a previous draft.  For more information on the Colloquium, which 
was hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 
12, 2018, at Fordham University School of Law, see Bruce A. Green, Lawyers in Government 
Service—a Foreword, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1791 (2019). 
 
 1. See Peter Margulies, Reforming Lawyers into Irrelevance?:  Reconciling Crisis and 
Constraint at the Office of Legal Counsel, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 809, 815 (2012) [hereinafter 
Margulies, Reforming Lawyers]; Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law:  National Security 
Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1, 66–70 
(2008); Peter Margulies, When to Push the Envelope:  Legal Ethics, the Rule of Law, and 
National Security Strategy, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 642, 661 (2007).  Professor Wendel also 
identified similar factors—particularly a common body of unwritten norms—as key to 
distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate government lawyering. See W. Bradley 
Wendel, Government Lawyers in the Trump Administration, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 277 
(2017). 
 2. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of 
Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2018). 
 3. McGahn resigned as White House Counsel in October 2018. See Michael S. Schmidt 
& Maggie Haberman, McGahn, Soldier for Trump and Witness Against Him, Leaves White 
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improvising adjustments to presidential policies or slow-walking action 
despite President Trump’s urge to take more drastic actions, like firing 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller.4  In this respect, those practicing lifeboat 
lawyering echo the familiar virtues of dialogic lawyering and preserve the 
legitimacy of the administration in the face of critics who contend that it is 
out of control.  As we shall see, however, lifeboat lawyering’s ongoing 
improvisations are themselves difficult to control and sometimes veer 
dangerously close to the excesses of insular lawyering. 
 
House, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/us/politics/don-
mcgahn-leaves-trump-administration.html [https://perma.cc/C4RV-PJJT].  Beginning in late 
October 2018, Washington lawyer Emmet Flood directed the Office of White House Counsel 
on an interim basis as part of a transition to a new permanent counsel, Pat Cipollone. See John 
Wagner, Josh Dawsey & Felicia Sonmez, Trump Vows Executive Order to End Birthright 
Citizenship, a Move Most Legal Experts Say Would Run Afoul of the Constitution, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-eyeing-executive-
order-to-end-citizenship-for-children-of-noncitizens-born-on-us-soil/2018/10/30/66892050-
dc29-11e8-b3f0-62607289efee_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZJK2-QWBF].  Since President 
Trump regularly pushes to implement policies that rely on aggressive interpretations of 
applicable law, the issues described in this Article will likely persist. See id. 
 4. As of this writing, Robert Mueller is leading an investigation into the Trump 
campaign’s possible collusion with Russian efforts to disrupt or influence the 2016 
presidential election. Rebecca R. Ruiz & Mark Landler, Robert Mueller, Former F.B.I. 
Director, Is Named Special Counsel for Russia Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/us/politics/robert-mueller-special-counsel-russia-
investigation.html [http://perma.cc/8MZW-5J42].  Several media outlets reported or 
commented on McGahn’s efforts to persuade President Trump to deliberate before seeking to 
fire Mueller or former FBI Director James Comey. See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD, FEAR:  TRUMP 
IN THE WHITE HOUSE 163 (2018) (explaining that McGahn urged President Trump to follow a 
process for dismissing Comey and describing how White House staff increasingly invoked the 
necessity of following a process as a stall tactic); see also Editorial, The Anonymous 
Resistance, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2018, 7:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-
anonymous-resistance-1536276239 [https://perma.cc/85UQ-NSTE] (discussing internal 
administration moves to postpone or temper various actions by President Trump); Opinion, I 
Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-
resistance.html [https://perma.cc/FJZ2-MKZ3].  Officials on and off the record have contested 
these accounts. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Maggie Haberman, Trump Lashes Out After Reports 
of ‘Quiet Resistance’ by Staff, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/ 
05/us/politics/trump-new-york-times-anonymous-editorial.html [http://perma.cc/LJ46-J297].  
Because these and similar stories have become pervasive with respect to the Trump 
administration, this Article assumes that the accounts are accurate.  Nevertheless, an informed 
reader should always seek corroboration of such accounts and remain open to the possibility 
that particular accounts are inaccurate in whole or part.  Moreover, this Article acknowledges 
that such attempts to moderate presidential behavior have occurred from time to time in past 
administrations. See id. (describing efforts in the Wilson, Reagan, and Nixon administrations 
to limit presidential activities).  However, if current accounts are accurate, the incidence and 
intensity of such efforts have risen substantially in the current administration. 
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Any administration contains a mix of lawyering styles.5  There are 
examples of dialogic lawyering in the Trump administration,6 as well as 
insular and lifeboat modes.7  To focus on what is distinctive about the current 
administration, this Article focuses on the interaction between the latter two 
approaches.  A comprehensive understanding of continuity and change in the 
Trump administration’s various lawyering styles will have to wait until 
another day, although that deeper understanding will be worth the effort. 
The interaction of insular and lifeboat lawyering in the Trump 
administration often centers on unwritten norms.  Sometimes called “soft 
law,”8 unwritten norms are an important aspect of governance since they 
generally have bipartisan acceptance and thus form a backdrop for 
policymakers.9  This Article treats departures from unwritten norms as 
insular lawyering.  In certain situations, including advising President Trump 
against firing Special Counsel Robert Mueller, Trump administration 
lawyers have sought to preserve unwritten norms such as prosecutorial 
independence.10  Those efforts, which often take place behind the scenes, are 
 
 5. Professor Robert Bauer, a former White House Counsel, has provided an excellent 
descriptive and normative account of lawyering in the dynamic national security sphere. See 
generally Robert F. Bauer, The National Security Lawyer, In Crisis:  When the “Best View” 
of the Law May Not Be the Best View, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175 (2018).  But see Mary 
DeRosa, National Security Lawyering:  The Best View of the Law as a Regulative Ideal, 31 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 277, 279 (2018); Christopher Fonzone & Dana Remus, What About 
When the Best View Is the Best View?, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305, 331 (2018) (suggesting 
that the goal of providing the “best view” under the law safeguards the independence of 
government lawyers); Jack Goldsmith, Executive Branch Crisis Lawyering and the “Best 
View,” 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 261, 265–66 (2018) (cautioning against adopting Bauer’s 
normative approach, while agreeing on the need for a measure of flexibility in legal advice to 
the executive branch on national security issues). 
 6. See, e.g., Office of Legal Counsel, Opinion on April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian 
Chemical-Weapons Facilities 1 (May 31, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/ 
1067551/download [https://perma.cc/8X9M-YWS5] (arguing that President Trump’s strikes 
against Syrian targets were consistent with the separation of powers and applicable 
legislation); see also Jack Goldsmith, The New OLC Opinion on Syria Brings Obama Legal 
Rationales Out of the Shadows, LAWFARE (June 1, 2018, 3:02 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-olc-opinion-syria-brings-obama-legal-rationales-out-
shadows [https://perma.cc/69JL-3ALP] (suggesting that there is continuity between legal 
interpretations in the Obama administration and the Office of Legal Counsel’s rationale for 
President Trump’s Syria strikes). 
 7. See Steve Vladeck, OLC’s Formal (and Remarkably Broad) Defense of the April Syria 
Strikes, JUST SECURITY (June 1, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/57300/olcs-formal-and-
remarkably-broad-defense-april-syria-strikes/ [https://perma.cc/LXU5-W2TJ] (arguing that 
the OLC’s Syria opinion reflects an unprecedentedly broad view of executive power). 
 8. See generally Peter Margulies, Global Cybersecurity, Surveillance, and Privacy:  The 
Obama Administration’s Conflicted Legacy, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2017) 
(discussing the contrast between collaborative establishment of soft law on cybersecurity and 
aggressive approach of law enforcement in stressing access to content carried on new 
communications devices over consumers’ privacy and information-security interests). 
 9. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 69 (discussing unwritten norms of prosecutorial 
independence); Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 
2206–42 (2018) (describing unwritten executive branch norms). 
 10. See Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but 
Backed Off when White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), 
1916 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
examples of lifeboat lawyering.  President Trump’s persistent and public 
efforts to disrupt unwritten norms—displayed in tweets, public remarks, and 
other contexts—make the preservation of such norms a focal point. 
Part I of this Article describes insular lawyering and discusses the legal 
opinions that authorized the George W. Bush administration’s Terrorist 
Surveillance Program as an example of insular lawyering.  Part II discusses 
insular lawyering in the Trump administration and centers on the 
unprecedented release of materials related to a Department of Justice (DOJ) 
request for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant in its 
investigation of Russian meddling in the 2016 election.  Finally, Part III 
sketches a model of lifeboat lawyering, which includes lawyers’ adaptations 
to exigent circumstances and triage of troubling executive branch decisions.  
This final Part asks whether the lifeboat label applies to a letter by White 
House Counsel McGahn authorizing the release of FISA-related materials 
described in Part II.  This Article argues that lifeboat lawyering—while 
sometimes necessary—is also risky because it can readily morph into the 
insular mode’s excesses. 
I.  INSULAR LAWYERING IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Insular lawyering has been a mainstay of administrations of both parties.  
This Article links insular lawyering to several flaws:  a lack of reasoned 
elaboration, hostility toward other institutions, and abrupt breaks with 
unwritten norms.  A brief discussion of these terms will inform the reader. 
“Reasoned elaboration” refers to the methodical provision of 
justifications.11  Alexander Hamilton believed that a legal argument’s 
assiduous search for ordered justifications would moderate the short-term 
impulses that can imperil constitutional republics.12  The perception of 
moderation may also temper responses to executive action from other 
stakeholders, such as Congress, the courts, and the public, and reduce 
“pendular swings” that can disrupt republican governance.13  In addition, the 
practice of providing justifications promotes sound substantive policy by 




 11. See BRYAN GARSTEN, SAVING PERSUASION 121 (2006) (contrasting giving reasons 
with political demagoguery, which relies on slogans, stories, and images with emotional 
resonance).  Of course, reasoned discourse may also have a narrative and emotional 
component, and even demagoguery has its own brand of logic.  A full examination of the role 
of emotion in reasoned elaboration is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 12. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 13. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008). 
 14. Cf. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:  LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 144–56 (2007) (discussing Goldsmith’s decision to withdraw DOJ 
memoranda on interrogation of detainees due to the overly broad justifications in those 
documents and the indignation at Goldsmith’s decision displayed by other administration 
officials, who wished to continue the ill-advised approach that the prior memoranda had 
defended). 
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Such a moderated process is also likely to both embody and convey respect 
for other institutions and for past practice that exemplifies unwritten norms.  
Lawyers weighing legal authority will likely consider the interests of relevant 
stakeholders, including institutions such as Congress and the courts.15  They 
will also likely consider past practice within the executive branch.  Although 
past practice may not be binding or dispositive, it can serve as a useful guide 
to what is possible and the real-world consequences of past actions.16  As the 
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated, accumulated wisdom is often 
useful, particularly because the Constitution provides a somewhat muddled 
template and ambiguous statutes can cause unwanted effects.17  Moreover, 
past practice may reflect unwritten norms, like judicial independence, which 
have tempered efforts to “pack the Court” or strip the federal courts of their 
jurisdiction.18 
Insular lawyering upends these virtues.  Instead of reasoned elaboration, 
insular lawyering resorts to opacity.19  Insular lawyering rejects established 
institutions and tries to ignore, circumvent, or undermine other stakeholders.  
Unwritten norms similarly receive short shrift. 
The Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) established by President George 
W. Bush in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks provides an example of insular 
lawyering.20  At various points, that program apparently entailed the bulk 
collection of internet metadata and communications between U.S. persons—
American citizens, lawful permanent residents, and others physically present 
 
 15. See Arthur H. Garrison, The Role of the OLC in Providing Legal Advice to the 
Commander-in-Chief After September 11th:  The Choices Made by the Bush Administration 
Office of Legal Counsel, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 648, 662 (2012) (noting that 
questions of law posed to administration lawyers implicate interests beyond policy and 
politics). 
 16. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015) 
(relying on historical examples to establish the president’s exclusive power to recognize 
foreign governments); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (emphasizing a 
longstanding history of presidents making recess appointments); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor 
W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 417–
24 (2012) (discussing the importance of historical practice to interpretations of separation of 
powers). 
 17. See, e.g., Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559 (“[L]ong settled and established practice 
is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions . . . .” 
(quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929))). 
 18. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional 
Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 317–18 (2017) 
(noting bipartisan acceptance of this norm). 
 19. Cf. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 278, 282–83, 287 (2010) 
(analyzing secrecy’s risks and benefits). 
 20. See Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency 
Described by the President, 30 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 NSA Memo], 
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/477041/download [https://perma.cc/Q4EJ-35HX]; Julian 
Sanchez, Reading Jack Goldsmith’s STELLARWIND Memo (Part I), JUST SECURITY (Sept. 10, 
2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/14789/reading-jack-goldsmiths-stellarwind-memo/ 
[https://perma.cc/7KCT-G6EA]. 
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in the United States—and foreign parties.21  Under FISA,22 which provided 
a comprehensive, finely calibrated scheme for monitoring communications 
by foreign agents within the United States, the TSP was of questionable 
legality.23  FISA required the government to obtain a warrant before 
wiretapping such communications.24  Thus, Congress’s enactment of this 
comprehensive scheme likely precluded warrantless wiretaps involving U.S. 
persons.25  Congress could have authorized such wiretaps,26 but its failure to 
do so suggests that Congress sought to prohibit this activity.27  Moreover, the 
president defied Congress’s mandate and insisted on authority to engage in 
warrantless wiretaps, leaving him in territory where the courts are least likely 
to exercise deference.28 
A 2006 white paper, authored and published by the DOJ, circumvented the 
legal requirements for wiretaps under FISA and instead argued that the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) enacted by Congress 
shortly after 9/11 changed the calculus.29  According to the DOJ, the AUMF 
authorized the president to order actions that were “necessary and 
appropriate” to deter future attacks from those responsible for 9/11.30  The 
DOJ asserted that collection of the communications at issue was necessary 
and appropriate.31  It then asserted that the AUMF modified FISA’s 
comprehensive scheme.32  Indeed, the agency claimed that reading FISA as 
 
 21. Professor Jack Goldsmith, when he served at the OLC, authored a memorandum in 
2004 for the George W. Bush administration that the Obama administration subsequently 
released under a Freedom of Information Act request. See Sanchez, supra note 20.  
Goldsmith’s memorandum, while heavily redacted in its public form, appears to suggest that 
indiscriminate collection of metadata would violate FISA. See id. 
 22. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012). 
 23. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 117–19 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 24. See id. at 121, 130 (noting that the Fourth Amendment imposes a warrant requirement 
for surveillance of communications of foreign agents located within the United States). 
 25. See Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of Youngstown, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 
263, 316–24 (2010).  But see John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the 
Constitution, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 565, 566–68 (2007) (arguing that President Bush’s 
authority under Article II of the Constitution supported the lawfulness of the TSP and that 
FISA had to be read in light of the president’s Article II power); Memorandum from Jack L. 
Goldsmith, III, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Att’y Gen. 21–24 (May 6, 
2004), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2014/09/19/may_6_ 
2004_goldsmith_opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5EA-M6XE] (arguing for the legality of a 
narrower version of STELLARWIND that President Bush authorized in 2004). 
 26. See United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 441–44 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
section 702 of FISA, which authorizes warrantless surveillance of one-end foreign 
communications, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment). 
 27. Cf. Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory 
Interpretation:  Interpretative Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. 
REV. 71, 117–18 (2018) (explaining the statutory interpretation canon, “expressio/inclusio 
unius est exclusio alterius,” which holds that Congress’s express authorization for one action 
is an express prohibition of any other action). 
 28. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 29. 2006 NSA Memo, supra note 20, at 35. 
 30. Id. at 25–26. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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prohibiting the TSP would render FISA an unconstitutional infringement on 
the president’s Article II authority.33 
The DOJ white paper unduly expanded interpretations of both the AUMF 
and the president’s Article II authority.  The AUMF may permit exclusively 
foreign intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, which are 
incident to war.34  However, reading the AUMF as authorizing surveillance 
of constitutionally protected U.S. persons is a stretch.  Similarly, the 
president’s Article II powers do not extend that far.  If the executive 
possessed such power under Article II, any action by Congress would survive 
solely as a matter of presidential grace.  The framers surely did not intend to 
place Congress in such a precarious position. 
The DOJ white paper’s skewed reading is an apt example of insular 
lawyering.  A reasonable observer would assume that Congress had authority 
under its war, law enforcement, and commerce powers to set up a 
comprehensive structure governing surveillance of U.S. persons.  
Admittedly, the president would have residual power over collection of 
purely foreign communications.35  Congress, however, would have the last 
word on communications in which U.S. persons participated.36  The DOJ’s 
approach went far beyond this reasonable reading and cited a hidden source 
of presidential authority.37  The interpretation that the DOJ favored defied 
commonsense understandings of statutory and constitutional structure.  
Moreover, until two enterprising New York Times reporters disclosed the 
TSP’s existence in late 2005, both the existence of the TSP and the legal 
justifications for it were completely unknown.38  This process of secret law 
is typical of insular lawyering.39 
 
 33. Id.; see also Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 21–24. 
 34. See generally ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO 
GATHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (2006), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/ 
m010506.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD82-3KEN].  For more information, see also Matthew C. 
Waxman, The Power to Wage War Successfully, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 613, 642 (2017). 
 35. See, e.g., United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he Executive 
Branch need not always obtain a warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance.”). 
 36. See Swaine, supra note 25, at 316–17.  Goldsmith’s 2004 memorandum appeared to 
concede that FISA did preclude certain elements of the pre-2004 TSP, such as the 
indiscriminate collection of internet metadata. See Sanchez, supra note 20; see also 
GOLDSMITH, supra note 14, at 182 (explaining that Goldsmith and former FBI Director James 
Comey convened at the hospital bedside of then–Attorney General John Ashcroft to head off 
efforts of other Bush administration officials to secure Ashcroft’s approval of the original 
TSP).  A comprehensive assessment of the post-2004 TSP is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but the pre-2004 TSP’s legal underpinnings frame the role of insular lawyering. 
 37. See 2006 NSA Memo, supra note 20, at 1 (“The NSA activities are supported by the 
President’s well-recognized inherent constitutional authority . . . .”). 
 38. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-
callers-without-courts.html [https://perma.cc/C9P6-U6VG]. 
 39. Another example from the Bush administration concerns the legal rationale for 
interrogation of certain “high-value” post-9/11 detainees. See Memorandum from Jay S. 
Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, on Standards 
of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, at 1–2 (Aug. 1, 2002); see also 
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 162, 176–80, 200–02 (2007); Kathleen 
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II.  THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INSULAR LAWYERING 
Exhibit A in the Trump administration’s catalogue of insular lawyering 
also concerns FISA.  In early 2018, White House Counsel Donald McGahn 
sent a letter conveying the White House’s decision to declassify and release 
certain documents addressing a specific FISA warrant request.40  The DOJ 
submitted the request to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) 
while investigating Carter Page.  Page, who had links to Russia, had served 
as a foreign policy aide to then-candidate Trump.41  McGahn’s letter is a 
disturbing example of insular lawyering.  However, to appreciate the risks 
undertaken by McGahn requires an understanding of the difference between 
his letter and insular lawyering in prior administrations. 
Notably, McGahn’s letter, unlike the DOJ white paper published during 
the Bush administration, does not involve a new program that may conflict 
with FISA.42  Instead of being programmatic in focus, McGahn’s letter is 
remarkably particular.  Indeed, unlike most other presidential actions 
facilitated by insular lawyering, McGahn, at least on the surface, did not seek 
to augment executive power.43  The material that McGahn authorized for 
 
Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 455, 462 (2005); Margulies, Reforming Lawyers, supra note 1, at 835–40 (warning 
against overreacting to episodes of insular lawyering by enacting rigid rules that unduly impair 
a lawyer’s ability to provide legal advice to the executive branch); Trevor W. Morrison, 
Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1726–29 (2011) (reviewing BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC (2010)) (asserting that authors 
of memoranda on coercive interrogations suffered significant adverse consequences, although 
those consequences were less formal than some critics of the underlying policies might have 
wished); Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney 
General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1975–76 (2008); Stephen I. Vladeck, Justice Jackson, the 
Memory of Internment, and the Rule of Law after the Bush Administration, in WHEN 
GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW:  THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 183, 201–07 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2010) (discussing the 
appropriate blending of formal and informal sanctions for past government overreaching); 
Wendel, supra note 1, at 207–08; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law 
and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 80–85 (2005) (arguing that the 2002 OLC opinions 
violated settled public understandings of interrogation). 
 40. See generally Letter from Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the President, to Devin 
Nunes, Chairman, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Feb. 2, 2018) [hereinafter 
McGahn Letter]. 
 41. Verified Application at 4, In re Page (FISA Ct. Oct. 2016). 
 42. See 2006 NSA Memo, supra note 20, at 17–34 (providing rationales for why the NSA 
TSP activities were consistent with FISA). 
 43. This list would include not only DOJ memoranda on the TSP and the post-9/11 
interrogation program but also earlier advice that straddled the line between appropriately 
aggressive counsel and insular lawyering. See Bauer, supra note 5, at 180–229 (analyzing 
examples, such as President Roosevelt’s destroyer deal with Britain during World War II and 
the U.S. blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis); see also Gabriella Blum, The Role of the 
Client:  The President’s Role in Government Lawyering, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275, 
281 (2009) (arguing that, although senior officials typically seek legal advice approving 
proposed actions, when action is sound for policy reasons but legally questionable, lawyers 
should not provide an unduly expansive legal interpretation; instead, senior officials should 
assume responsibility for taking correct action over lawyers’ disagreement); cf. OREN GROSS 
& FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS:  EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 123–27 (2006) (discussing the view expressed by Jefferson regarding the 
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release—a report by the Republican majority of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on the Carter Page FISA request44—
actually criticized the DOJ FISA request as an abuse of power by the 
executive branch.45  The White House clearly had legal authority46 to release 
the HPSCI majority report, which was drafted by the staff of the HPSCI chair, 
Devin Nunes.47 
Moreover, on the surface, McGahn’s letter and Nunes’s memo were 
neither secret nor opaque.  While the white paper was top secret and very 
closely held within the Bush administration, McGahn’s intended audience 
was the public.  If secrecy is a sine qua non of insular lawyering, McGahn’s 
letter does not qualify. 
Although McGahn’s letter was public, in its own way it reflected the 
disregard of unwritten norms and established institutions that is characteristic 
of insular lawyering.  In addition, McGahn’s letter and Nunes’s memo did 
aim to augment presidential power.  By seeking to discredit the investigation 
of the Trump campaign’s collusion with Russia in the 2016 election, Nunes’s 
memo sought to augment the power and political standing of one particular 
occupant of the White House:  President Donald J. Trump.48  The McGahn 
letter’s misleading rationale for approving the release of Nunes’s memo 
reinforced the memo’s goals.49 
 
questionable legality of the Louisiana Purchase that the president should act, explain the 
reasons for the action, and seek public ratification or at least acquiescence); Oren Gross, Chaos 
and Rules:  Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 
1011, 1099–109 (2003). 
 44. See Memorandum from HPSCI Majority Staff to HPSCI Majority Members on the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Abuses at the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 1 (Jan. 18, 2018) [hereinafter Nunes Memo]. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (noting the president’s broad 
authority over sensitive national security information). 
 47. Many members of the HPSCI majority who signed the report lacked access to the 
underlying FISA materials that the report described. Memorandum from HPSCI Minority to 
All Members of the House of Representatives on Correcting the Record—the Russia 
Investigations 2 & 8 nn.1–2 (Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Schiff Memo]. 
 48. Some Republican House members who signed on to Nunes’s memo, such as 
Representative Trey Gowdy of South Carolina, had a narrower goal of casting doubt on the 
Carter Page FISA request without undermining the Mueller inquiry. See Trey Gowdy 
(@TGowdySC), TWITTER (Feb. 2, 2018, 10:34 AM), https://twitter.com/TGowdySC/ 
status/959495152770469888 [https://perma.cc/3EFD-WD7U]. 
 49. It is not clear that Nunes achieved this goal.  Nunes’s memo was so blatantly deceptive 
that it may have influenced only members of the public who were already convinced by 
President Trump’s repeated claims that the Russia investigation is a “witch hunt.” See, e.g., 
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 12, 2019, 6:20 AM), 
http://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1084092774633353217 [https://perma.cc/Q5GM-
ZYMF] (“Part of the Witch Hunt.”); see also Olivia Paschal, Trump’s Tweets and the Creation 
of ‘Illusory Truth,’ ATLANTIC (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2018/08/how-trumps-witch-hunt-tweets-create-an-illusory-truth/566693/ [https://perma.cc/ 
UTQ9-K62N] (reporting that the president referred to the Mueller probe as a “witch hunt” 
over eighty-four times in 2018 alone).  On the other hand, the public is often credulous, so one 
cannot discount the impact of Nunes’s memo on public perceptions of the Russia 
investigation. 
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A.  The Carter Page FISA Request 
To understand insular lawyering, it is important to understand the Carter 
Page investigation.  In a March 2016 interview with the Washington Post, 
then-candidate Donald Trump identified Page as one of his foreign policy 
advisors.50  For years prior to being singled out as an advisor to Trump, Page 
was active in matters involving energy interests in Russia and apparently 
expressed strong views favoring Russian strongman Vladimir Putin.51  In 
October 2016, as Obama administration intelligence and national security 
officials publicly expressed concern that Russia was meddling in the U.S. 
presidential election, the DOJ’s National Security Division requested a FISA 
warrant to collect Page’s communications and asserted that probable cause 
existed to believe that Page was an agent of the Russian government and that 
the communications would yield foreign intelligence information.52  The 
FISC granted the warrant request.53 
B.  The Nunes Memo’s Misleading Claims 
Nunes’s memo made a loaded accusation about the DOJ’s request for a 
FISA warrant in Page’s case.  According to Nunes’s memo, the National 
Security Division had not shown probable cause.54  Instead, according to 
Nunes, it had relied largely, if not exclusively, on a partisan dossier complied 
by former British intelligence operative Christopher Steele.55  While a law 
firm that represented Hillary Clinton’s campaign committee had paid for 
Steele’s work, Nunes asserted that the DOJ had knowingly concealed this 
fact from the FISC.56  The provenance of Steele’s dossier was clearly a 
material fact in the assessment of the dossier’s reliability. 
Nunes’s memo was a frontal assault on the DOJ and the FISA process.  It 
asserted that the DOJ had submitted a warrant application to the FISC in 
which it knowingly relied almost exclusively on a partisan report.57  
Moreover, according to Nunes, the DOJ had knowingly concealed a material 
 
 50. See Rosalind S. Helderman, Memo Points to FBI’s Sustained Interest in Carter Page, 
Ex-Adviser to Trump, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/memo-points-to-fbis-ongoing-interest-in-trump-adviser-carter-page/2018/02/02/ 
89bfdee2-077c-11e8-8777-2a059f168dd2_story.html [https://perma.cc/AW7A-G4LA].  
Another former Trump foreign policy adviser, George Papadopoulos, pled guilty to making 
false statements to FBI agents about his ties to Russia in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See 
Statement of the Offense at 1–3, United States v. Papadopoulos, No. 1:17-cr-00182-RDM 
(D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2017), ECF No. 19. 
 51. See Natasha Betrand, ‘Carter Page Is a Very Unlikely GOP Hero,’ ATLANTIC (Sept. 
19, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/09/carter-page-is-a-very-
unlikely-gop-hero/570655/ [https://perma.cc/FLF3-PN9F]. 
 52. Verified Application, supra note 41, at 32. 
 53. Primary Order and Warrant at 2, In re Page (FISA Ct. Oct. 2016). 
 54. See Nunes Memo, supra note 44, at 1. 
 55. See id. at 2. 
 56. Id. (asserting that neither the DOJ’s initial nor follow-up FISA applications “disclose 
or reference the role of the [Democratic National Committee], Clinton campaign, or any 
party/campaign in funding Steele’s efforts” (emphasis added)). 
 57. Id. at 2. 
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fact from the tribunal.58  The release of Nunes’s memo threatened the FISA 
process’s efficacy and legitimacy.  First, Congress did not intend that the 
DOJ and the FISC transact FISA business in a fishbowl.59  Public disclosure 
of FISA requests is generally not sound practice, since even seemingly 
harmless segments from a request can compromise intelligence sources and 
methods.60  Second, Nunes’s memo made explosive and unsupported claims 
about the courts, law enforcement, and the intelligence community’s 
compliance with law.61  Recall that Nunes contended that the DOJ request 
was both baseless and materially misleading.62  Nunes’s memo also 
intimated that the FISC, composed of Article III district court judges, was 
either inordinately passive or complicit in the DOJ’s misrepresentations.63 
That is not all.  Nunes made these accusations about an ongoing DOJ 
investigation, which violated the unwritten norm of prosecutorial 
independence from both legislative and executive pressure.64  In addition, 
Nunes’s charges against the DOJ and the FISC did not concern a garden-
variety investigation.  They concerned an investigation of the Russia ties of 
an individual whom then-candidate Donald Trump had acknowledged as an 
advisor on foreign affairs.65  The investigation therefore was relevant to 
charges that the Trump campaign had colluded with Russian efforts to 
interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election.  Indeed, Nunes’s memo 
dovetailed precisely with constant claims by now-President Trump that the 
Russia investigation, led by Special Counsel Robert Mueller, was itself a 
partisan “witch hunt.”66 
Despite its attack on established institutions like the DOJ and the FISC, 
and its breach of unwritten norms, Nunes’s memo may have been an 
appropriate action for a congressional committee if the report’s claims were 
correct.  However, the memo’s claims were profoundly misleading.  First, 
federal law enforcement had been aware of Page’s pro-Russian activities 
 
 58. Id. at 3. 
 59. See generally Peter Margulies, Defining “Foreign Affairs” in Section 702 of the FISA 
Amendments Act:  The Virtues and Deficits of Post-Snowden Dialogue on U.S. Surveillance 
Policy, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1283 (2015) (discussing trade-offs between transparency and 
efficacy in intelligence collection). 
 60. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985).  See generally David E. Pozen, Note, The 
Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 
(2005) (analyzing the “mosaic theory” for limiting public disclosure of government 
information about national security). 
 61. See David Kris, The Irony of the Nunes Memo, LAWFARE (Mar. 1, 2018, 12:52 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/irony-nunes-memo [https://perma.cc/W3PY-GFFW]. 
 62. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Nunes Memo, supra note 44, at 1–2. 
 64. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 69–74 (discussing the importance of 
prosecutorial independence). 
 65. See Verified Application, supra note 41, at 4; Michael Crowley, Trump’s Foreign 
Policy Team Baffles GOP Experts, POLITICO (Mar. 21, 2016, 7:45 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/donald-trump-foreign-policy-advisers-221058 
[https://perma.cc/559Y-4D4K] (announcing then-candidate Trump’s foreign policy team, 
including Carter Page and George Papadopoulos). 
 66. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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since 2013—well before compilation of the Steele dossier.67  Second, the 
DOJ’s FISA request used only a modest portion of information from Steele 
and included abundant evidence beyond the information in the dossier.68  
Third, the DOJ’s FISA request fully disclosed that Steele and his funders had 
a political stake in his activities.69 
The DOJ did not refer to Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, or their 
respective campaigns by name because of its longtime policy to avoid the 
unmasking of U.S. citizens in FISA materials.70  The DOJ request, however, 
provided copious details about the 2016 election that alerted a reasonably 
attentive reader to the identities of the candidates, whom the DOJ coyly 
referred to as “Candidate #1” (Trump)71 and “Candidate #2” (Clinton).72  The 
DOJ referred to Steele as “Source #1” and, in a lengthy footnote, disclosed 
Steele’s work on behalf of a law firm doing opposition research on Trump.73  
The logical inference from the DOJ’s explanation of the political connections 
of Source #1 (Steele) was that the “U.S.-based law firm” seeking to discredit 
Candidate #1 (Trump) represented the Clinton campaign or an individual or 
entity closely allied with that organization. 
The FISC’s judges are not casual consumers of FISA warrant applications; 
they read the footnotes.74  In sum, the FISA request provided the FISC with 
ample information on Steele’s ties to Trump’s political opponents.75  The 
Nunes memo’s claims that DOJ failed to disclose these facts were blatant 
misrepresentations squarely contradicted by the record. 
C.  McGahn’s Letter Reinforced Nunes’s Misleading Memo 
While McGahn’s letter authorizing the release of Nunes’s memo is 
anodyne on its face, its content and context display attributes of insular 
 
 67. See Byron Tau, Trump Says Democrats Must ‘Re-Do’ Memo They Want to Release, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2018, 12:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-denies-
democratic-request-to-release-memo-seeks-revisions-1518224387 [https://perma.cc/ZDJ6-
LBYQ]. 
 68. See Verified Application, supra note 41, at 21 (relying on open-source information, 
several published news articles, and Page’s own interview with the FBI); Schiff Memo, supra 
note 47 (discussing serious flaws in Nunes’s memo); see also Charlie Savage, Five Takeaways 
From the Release of the Democratic Memo, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/24/us/politics/takeaways-democratic-memo.html 
[https://perma.cc/DR4Q-XFLE] (summarizing Schiff’s memo). 
 69. See Verified Application, supra note 41, at 15 n.8. 
 70. See Kris, supra note 61. 
 71. Verified Application, supra note 41, at 4. 
 72. Id. at 18. 
 73. Id. at 15 & n.8, 16 (noting that a “U.S.-based law firm” had hired an “identified U.S. 
person” who in turn hired Steele to “conduct research regarding Candidate #1’s ties to Russia” 
and had done so with the “likely” purpose of finding information “that could be used to 
discredit Candidate #1’s campaign”). 
 74. Kris, supra note 61. 
 75. Verified Application, supra note 41, at 15 n.8 (“The identified U.S. person hired 
Source #1 to conduct this research.  The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to 
the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia.  The FBI speculates that 
the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit 
Candidate #1’s campaign.” (emphasis added)). 
2019] PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF FISA REQUESTS 1925 
lawyering.  First, consider the context.  By facilitating the release of Nunes’s 
memo and the HPSCI minority’s reply, McGahn became a party to the 
unprecedented disclosure of FISA requests.  Such disclosure can be 
damaging in ways not immediately apparent.  If disclosure reveals 
intelligence sources and methods, it can allow the United States’s adversaries 
to exploit weaknesses in the nation’s defenses.76  Moreover, the prospect of 
future disclosure of FISA requests for partisan and personal reasons 
undermines the FISA process.  The secrecy of FISA applications allows law 
enforcement and counterterrorism officials to be open with the FISC about 
the basis for their requests.  The prospect of future breaches of secrecy will 
chill those officials’ communications with the tribunal, which Congress 
established to ensure the accuracy and integrity of U.S. investigations of 
suspected foreign agents.  If officials become unduly reticent about seeking 
warrants due to concerns about eventual public disclosure, that hesitation will 
erode U.S. security.77 
Second, because of this adverse impact on the functioning of a process in 
which all three branches of the federal government have a stake, release of 
Nunes’s memo did not serve the presidency as an institution.  Rather, release 
of the memo was a concrete example of a risk that has long-driven constraints 
on executive branch discretion over surveillance:  the concern that particular 
presidents will exploit that discretion to punish political opponents and stifle 
challenges to their authority.78  One of the controversial elements of Nunes’s 
tenure as HPSCI chair was his unusual closeness with the White House—
particularly on matters pertaining to the Russia investigation, in which Nunes 
and the White House shared a partisan interest and the White House also had 
a personal interest.79  It seems plausible, if not highly probable, that Nunes 
drafted the majority HPSCI report with the full knowledge that the White 
House would authorize its release because of their shared interest in derailing 
the Russia probe.80 
 
 76. The materials released by the government may have been sufficiently redacted to 
minimize this risk. See David Kris, What to Make of the Carter Page FISA Applications, 
LAWFARE (July 21, 2018, 10:35 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-make-carter-page-
fisa-applications [https://perma.cc/XEP4-SXY8].  However, the better practice is not to 
trigger the risk in the first place. 
 77. See Peter Margulies, Searching for Federal Judicial Power:  Article III and the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 800, 856 (2017) (noting that 
secrecy is “vital” to detecting and responding to national security threats). 
 78. Id. at 809; cf. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972) 
(noting that “[h]istory abundantly documents the tendency of Government . . . to view with 
suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies”). 
 79. See, e.g., Philip Bump, In One Sentence, Devin Nunes Proved His Critics Right, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/08/09/ 
in-one-sentence-devin-nunes-proved-his-critics-right/ [https://perma.cc/V4QJ-ZQZA] 
(questioning whether Nunes could participate in the Russia investigation impartially). 
 80. Moreover, it is at least possible that Nunes informed the White House of the contents 
of the HPSCI report before it became final and even permitted the White House to review the 
report in draft form.  In a colloquy in January 2018, just prior to the release of Nunes’s memo, 
Nunes issued an equivocal denial that the White House had assisted in the report’s preparation. 
See Sharon LaFreniere & Nicholas Fandos, How Partisan Has House Intelligence Panel 
Become?  It’s Building a Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
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In analyzing McGahn’s public explanation of the White House’s decision 
to authorize release of Nunes’s memo, it is useful to consider the American 
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  Rule 1.7(a)(2) 
states that a conflict of interest may arise when the lawyer’s responsibility to 
provide loyal and competent representation is “materially limited” by a range 
of possible factors, including the lawyer’s “personal interest.”81  If McGahn 
had a conflict under this rule,82 it flowed from the conflict of interests and 
roles afflicting McGahn’s client, President Trump.  As White House 
Counsel, McGahn represented the Office of the President.83  McGahn 
represented President Trump in his official capacity, not in his individual 
capacity as a central figure in an ongoing criminal investigation.84  
Presidential reviews of material for public disclosure involve the president’s 
official role, not the personal penal interest of the White House’s current 
occupant.85  If McGahn, in advising President Trump, fulfilled his duty as 
White House Counsel in the former respect but endangered President 
Trump’s personal interest in the latter sense, the risk that President Trump 
would fire McGahn would likely be heightened.  The White House Counsel, 
like any political appointee, assumes the risk of dismissal for policy or 
political reasons.  Arguably, however, the White House Counsel does not 
assume the risk of firing because of the President’s personal interest in 
avoiding criminal prosecution.  Giving advice while confronting that 
heightened risk of firing may be a “personal interest of the lawyer” under 
Rule 1.7(a)(2) that “materially limit[s]” the lawyer’s representation of the 
Office of the President.86 
 
02/08/us/politics/house-intelligence-committee-russia-nunes.html [https://perma.cc/2352-
D7VA] (answering “[a]s far as I know, no” to a question about whether the White House had 
helped with the report). 
 81. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 82. This Article does not argue that McGahn had a conflict of interest that requires 
professional discipline.  Under the analysis advanced here, McGahn complied with the ethics 
rules.  Despite that caveat, analyzing McGahn’s approach under the rules illustrates the 
tensions inherent in lifeboat lawyering.  But the discussion of legal ethics proceeds against the 
backdrop of this important disclaimer. 
 83. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 
 84. Id. at 1277–83 (arguing that the role of a government lawyer is different from a 
lawyer’s role representing the president in his personal capacity). 
 85. Similarly, the president’s oath to “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 
United States” implies that the president will make decisions for the public good, not for the 
president’s private gain. See Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Shugerman, Faithful 
Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 25), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3260593 [http://perma.cc/8NZZ-K2G8]; 
Benjamin Wittes & Quinta Jurecic, What Happens When We Don’t Believe the President’s 
Oath?, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-happens-
when-we-dont-believe-presidents-oath [https://perma.cc/NE4Y-HGCW]. 
 86. This view of the lawyer’s personal interest may be difficult to square with Rule 
1.7(a)(2) as a pragmatic matter because it would preclude anyone from serving as White House 
Counsel in the Trump administration. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2016).  Perhaps the better interpretation of the rule’s language is to treat the 
lawyer’s interest in maintaining his position as a risk endemic to the practice of law.  On this 
view, the lawyer’s “personal interest” within the meaning of the rule would have to be more 
specific and concrete than the mere risk of getting fired, whatever the reason for the 
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In addition, McGahn might also have had an additional personal interest:  
his own interest in avoiding criminal prosecution because of complicity in 
crimes, such as obstruction of justice, linked to the Russia probe.  Reports 
indicate that McGahn had multiple lengthy interviews with Robert Mueller’s 
office about the firing of FBI Director James Comey and related matters.87  
According to reports, McGahn’s fear that President Trump was “setting 
[him] up” to take the fall for obstruction of justice played a role in 
encouraging those interviews.88  McGahn’s concerns may have led to a desire 
to discredit Mueller or perhaps placate Mueller’s office.  While the latter may 
seem less likely, the rules of legal ethics rightly look to whether conflicting 
interests may distort the lawyer’s judgment before the lawyer gives advice 
that may be skewed.  A material limitation under Rule 1.7(a)(2) can be cured 
if the lawyer:  (1) “reasonably believes” he or she can provide “competent 
and diligent representation,”89 and (2) obtains the client’s informed consent 
in writing.90  However, McGahn’s actions regarding Nunes’s memo may not 
have met either criterion.91 
 
termination.  On the other hand, a rule’s wide application in particular contexts may simply 
highlight its importance; wide application is usually not a reason in and of itself to construe a 
rule differently.  In any event, an ethical analysis assuming Rule 1.7(a)(2)’s applicability helps 
illustrate the awkward position in which senior Trump administration lawyers find themselves 
on a regular basis. 
 87. See Maggie Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Lawyers’ Sudden Realization:  
They Don’t Know What Don McGahn Told Mueller’s Team, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/19/us/politics/don-mcgahn-trump-mueller.html 
[https://perma.cc/YRL9-SMPL]. 
 88. Id.  It is also possible that McGahn was willing to sit down with Mueller because 
McGahn himself was concerned about the activities of the Trump campaign and President 
Trump’s subsequent decisions, such as the Comey firing, that impacted the Russia 
investigation. See Bob Bauer, Don McGahn as White House Counsel:  An Early Appraisal, 
LAWFARE (Sept. 2, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/don-mcgahn-white-
house-counsel-early-appraisal [https://perma.cc/EQF8-TTXW].  However, that motivation—
however commendable—would not cure any conflict of interest that McGahn experienced in 
reviewing Nunes’s memo or describing the White House decision to approve its release.  Rules 
governing conflicts of interest are even more important when lawyers’ motivations become 
tangled and difficult to parse. 
 89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 90. Id. r. 1.7(b)(4). 
 91. The first factor—reasonable belief in the possibility of providing sound 
representation—may be triggered if McGahn was personally fearful of being fired. See id. r. 
1.7(a)(2).  There are some indications that McGahn was not fearful of this prospect and, 
indeed, had been looking to leave his job for some time. Julie Hirschfeld Davis et al., Don 
McGahn to Leave White House Counsel Job This Fall, Trump Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/us/politics/don-mcgahn-white-house-counsel-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/2K2P-SWC].  That would address the first factor.  However, the 
second condition would be far more difficult to meet.  Because of President Trump’s own 
conflicts between his role as president and his status as an individual involved in an ongoing 
criminal probe, President Trump may not have been able to provide informed consent within 
the meaning of the rule.  This Article does not raise the conflicts issue to attack McGahn’s 
integrity.  McGahn’s situation was complicated, and glib analysis obscures more than it 
enlightens.  Moreover, the complexities of McGahn’s situation stemmed from the actions and 
decisions of his client, President Trump, and from the conflicts afflicting President Trump 
himself.  As noted, it is possible that anyone who agreed to serve as White House Counsel 
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Moreover, despite its neutral tone, McGahn’s letter, which authorized 
release of Nunes’s memo, compounded Nunes’s profoundly deceptive claim 
that the DOJ FISA request was groundless and materially misleading.  Recall 
that Nunes’s memo asserted that the DOJ’s FISA requests did not “disclose 
or reference the role of . . . any party/campaign” regarding the Steele 
dossier.92  Nunes surely knew that this claim was patently false since the DOJ 
had included a lengthy discussion of the Steele dossier’s provenance in its 
request.93  At best, Nunes’s claim constituted a disingenuous use of arcane 
“private language”94 in which the phrase “any party/campaign” actually 
means any specifically named party or campaign. 
Practitioners of this private language would insist that their claim was 
accurate because the DOJ FISA request did not actually name the group that 
had funded Steele’s research.95  However, such private language claims are 
too artificial to provide a reasonable or accurate reading of the DOJ request.  
Those claims do not gain accuracy merely because of the DOJ’s efforts to 
comply with longstanding practice by avoiding unmasking a U.S. person.  As 
noted above, the DOJ FISA request, even though it did not identify Donald 
Trump or Hillary Clinton by name, made absolutely clear that it was referring 
to those individuals’ roles in the 2016 election and the efforts of their allies 
and acolytes.  Under any reading, the claims in Nunes’s memo were severely 
deceptive. 
Even without more, the White House’s decision to permit the release of 
Nunes’s memo despite this manifest deception was problematic because the 
release itself implied that Nunes’s memo was an accurate summation of the 
DOJ’s FISA request.  After all, at least in normal times, the White House 
would not knowingly authorize release of a profoundly deceptive document 
about a vital national security investigation.  McGahn’s description of 
Nunes’s memo did not dislodge this sadly mistaken impression.  
Characterizing the memo, McGahn wrote:  “To be clear, the Memorandum 
reflects the judgments of its congressional authors.”96  By referring to 
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Nunes’s judgments, McGahn reprised the private language claiming the DOJ 
request’s failure to name a candidate or campaign meant that it had not 
“disclose[d] or reference[d]” any campaign.97 
In common parlance, deceptive claims like those in Nunes’s memo are not 
judgments.  The term “judgment” refers to “discerning” and “comparing” 
with care.98  A plainly false claim does not meet the standards of balance, 
discernment, and reasonableness that we associate with the word.  McGahn 
could have used a word like “position” instead of “judgments.”  This term is 
more neutral:  an individual’s position on a topic can always be flawed and 
describing a view as a position has far less positive connotation than the term 
“judgment.”  Yet, McGahn did not opt for this course.  The ordinary reader, 
who may not consult the DOJ FISA request, the HPSCI minority report, or 
online commentary on these sources, was left to consider Nunes’s memo as 
an account of congressional judgments that the White House thought 
sufficiently sound to release to the world, despite longstanding traditions of 
keeping FISA requests secret. 
McGahn’s use of private language in referring to the Nunes memo’s 
blatant misrepresentations as judgments is not the only specific example of 
insular lawyering in his letter.  In addition, McGahn asserted that a 
presidential decision to approve release of a document generated by Congress 
should include “input from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
and the Department of Justice.”99  Here, again, the ordinary understanding is 
that those agencies approved the release of Nunes’s memo.  McGahn’s note 
that the White House had determined, “[c]onsistent with this review,” that 
release was appropriate reinforced this impression that both government 
agencies had lent their imprimatur to the release.100  However, news reports 
established that the DOJ, including the FBI, had repeatedly warned against 
release of the memo out of concern that it would compromise sources and 
methods.101  In this sense, too, McGahn’s letter was misleading about the 
nature of the input received from the DOJ—the agency primarily responsible 
for making FISA requests.  In a letter intended for general public distribution, 
the president’s lawyer should have been far more precise. 
III.  LIFEBOAT LAWYERING:  BAILING OUT THE SHIP OF STATE 
In opposition to the robust critique of McGahn’s letter laid out above, a 
more favorable interpretation is also available.  On this view, McGahn’s 
letter models the distinctive representational mode of the Trump 
 
 97. Nunes Memo, supra note 44, at 2. 
 98. See Judgment, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/judgment [https://perma.cc/5NB6-KZ3W] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 99. McGahn Letter, supra note 40, at 2. 
 100. Id. (emphasis added). 
 101. See, e.g., Anne Gearan, Trump’s Attacks on Justice and FBI Echo Election Claims of 
a ‘Rigged System,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
trumps-attacks-on-justice-and-fbi-echo-election-claims-of-a-rigged-system/2018/02/02/ 
a22b1e1c-082e-11e8-b48c-b07fea957bd5_story.html [https://perma.cc/X9NQ-SRFG] 
(noting that the FBI expressed “grave concerns” about the release of Nunes’s memo). 
1930 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
administration:  what this Article calls lifeboat lawyering.  That turn of the 
lens requires an explanation of lifeboat lawyering’s origins, virtues, and 
liabilities.  Chief among these are the unstable interaction between the 
lifeboat and insular modes and the challenges in distinguishing between 
them. 
A cottage industry of commentators has grown up around the premise that 
the Trump administration is like a leaky lifeboat, always at risk of sinking.102  
The captain—President Trump—is mercurial.  The administration’s senior 
lawyers, including Donald McGahn and even former Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions, conceived of their job as, at least in part, saving the president from 
himself and preserving a baseline respect for institutions and unwritten 
norms.103 
Of course, stress and exigent situations are hardly strangers to any 
administration, and mercurial decision-making was a risk that the framers 
noted over two centuries ago.104  Senior lawyers, including those advising 
the president on national security and related issues, have operated regularly 
in this challenging atmosphere.105  More generally, President Trump is 
hardly the first challenging client that the legal profession has encountered.  
That said, lifeboat lawyering, as the term is used in this Article, connotes 
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greater use of authority than is contemplated by the ABA’s Model Rules or 
is tailored to a specific client group (e.g., clients of questionable capacity).106  
For example, it appears that former White House Counsel McGahn 
repeatedly slow-walked requests by President Trump.107  Some of these 
actions may fall within the lawyer’s authority under the ethics rules.  
However, other modes of delay or more affirmative obfuscation may present 
greater ethical challenges. 
In addition to the ethical challenges that slow-walking and other lifeboat 
lawyering tactics may pose, it is important to note that lifeboat lawyering 
may entail triage of varying potential presidential decisions, each of which 
may pose legal problems.108  Doctors regularly conduct triage on prospective 
patients in emergencies such as epidemics, mass accidents, and armed 
conflicts.109  In conducting triage, doctors treat the sickest patients first, with 
the condition that those treated can be saved by treatment.110  In other words, 
doctors prioritize and sort patients using criteria that may entail allowing 
some patients to get worse while the doctors focus their efforts on the patients 
that require immediate care. 
For lifeboat lawyers, triage can have poignant and ethically troubling 
implications.  Lifeboat lawyers will see themselves as essential components 
of the lifeboat crew.  Even if they could leave, they believe they should stay 
on to help.111  However, that help can involve difficult tradeoffs in which a 
lawyer tolerates certain decisions that are illegal or ill-advised in order to stop 
or slow down other decisions that are even worse.  After all, a lawyer cannot 
stop everything.  There are too many potential bad decisions on the horizon 
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to stop them all.  Moreover, the lawyer’s client—here, President Trump—
may view some decisions as so central that even slow-walking such decisions 
may lead to the lawyer’s dismissal.  To avoid this result, the lawyer may 
allow many illegal and unwise decisions to stand in order to stop a few 
others.112 
In some situations, lifeboat lawyering may succeed.  For example, as of 
September 2018, it appeared that President Trump’s advisors—presumably 
including former White House Counsel McGahn—had persuaded the 
president not to immediately release unredacted versions of scores of 
documents and communications in the Russia probe, such as former FBI 
Director James Comey’s texts.113  Such an indiscriminate document dump 
would surely have been a treasure trove for America’s adversaries.  If 
McGahn played a role in this postponement pending DOJ review, perhaps 
McGahn’s willingness to “play ball” on releasing Nunes’s memo lent him 
sufficient clout with the president so that he could take that stance.  
Alternatively, McGahn’s willingness to stay a little bit longer may have 
saved the president from a less prudent White House Counsel.  However, we 
should mute our celebration of this arguable lifeboat lawyering success story. 
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The triage facet of lifeboat lawyering is fraught with problems.  First, 
lifeboat lawyers may overestimate their value and therefore permit decisions 
to stand that they should resist even if termination is the result.  Similarly, 
lawyers may underestimate the relative value of a “noisy withdrawal,”114 
which might prompt external stakeholders to rein in their client in a way that 
internal measures cannot.115  In addition, the lifeboat lawyer’s decisions are 
often made in secret, without review by the public or any independent 
agency.  Those decisions therefore lack the transparency that would be useful 
for assessing whether the lifeboat lawyer is making the right choices. 
As an example of the problems associated with lifeboat lawyering, 
consider again McGahn’s letter.  In the previous Part, this Article framed the 
letter as an example of insular lawyering, which reflected disdain for existing 
institutions and unwritten norms.  However, with a relatively minor turn of 
the lens, one can also perceive McGahn’s letter as an instance of lifeboat 
lawyering.  That fluid character should give us pause. 
McGahn’s letter meets lifeboat lawyering’s criteria.  In advising his 
readers “[t]o be clear” that the accompanying Nunes memo “reflects the 
judgments of its congressional authors,”116 one can argue that McGahn 
meticulously separated the White House from the report’s irresponsible 
claims.  As noted above, that separation is the only logical aim of 
emphasizing the congressional pedigree of the document that the White 
House approved for release.  Moreover, one can read the reference to the 
“judgments of . . . congressional authors” as sounding in sarcasm.117  First, 
the venerable trope of pointedly identifying a position with another 
individual often carries with it an acerbic subtext.  Consider Marc Antony’s 
relentless catalogue of the positions of Brutus in Antony’s funeral address 
for Julius Caesar in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar.118  Antony’s description of 
Brutus as an honorable man is among Western civilization’s signature uses 
of sarcasm.  Antony’s target was the Roman Senate; one can imagine a 
modern-day Antony discussing the “judgments of . . . congressional 
authors”119 with the same dryly devastating intent and effect. 
Moreover, after some initial hiccups, McGahn in due course also wrote a 
letter approving the release of the Democratic HPSCI report, which 
deconstructed the deceptions in the majority’s screed.  McGahn may have 
thought that the best remedy for the Nunes memo’s misrepresentations was 
the straightforward account of the Democratic legislators.120  Of course, 
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McGahn did not advertise this view.  He did not have to.  Public officials, 
pundits, and the media did it for him.  A reasonable lawyer in McGahn’s 
position could readily have believed that the Nunes memo’s deceptions 
would not survive contact with the actual facts laid out in the Democrats’ 
response.  On this view, the release of FISA documents would not have 
undermined institutions.  Instead, it would demonstrate the soundness of the 
FISA process in a concrete way that more generic government assurances 
could not. 
Moreover, this lifeboat lawyering account is entirely consistent with 
McGahn’s role as White House Counsel.  As the D.C. Circuit explained, the 
White House Counsel serves the Office of the President, not the personal 
legal interests of the White House’s current occupant.121  If McGahn 
reasonably believed that the effects of the release of Nunes’s memo would 
match those in the lifeboat lawyering account, his letter would dovetail nicely 
with the White House Counsel’s legal responsibilities. 
That said, a moment’s reflection should reveal the incongruities in the 
lifeboat lawyering version of McGahn’s FISA letter.  While the Brandeisian 
“more speech” account122 accurately reflects the response of many readers 
of Nunes’s memo, those sentiments were not unanimous.  Perhaps fueled by 
partisan rancor, many readers from President Trump’s base likely bought into 
the deceptive claims contained in Nunes’s memo.  The polarized, segmented 
state of our media discourse surely contributed to this division.  Individuals 
who get their news from Fox News’s opinion shows might well have agreed 
with Nunes’s memo and adopted its corrosive view of the FISA process.  If 
encouraging public faith in institutions is a goal of the White House Counsel, 
this effect clearly undermined that objective. 
Moreover, in issuing the letter, McGahn also defied the longtime 
bipartisan view that a fishbowl was not the appropriate venue for national 
security investigations.  To be sure, the accumulated wisdom of bipartisan 
public officials can be wrong.  However, a senior government lawyer should 
hesitate before assuming that the lawyer knows better.  It is not at all clear 
that McGahn went through such a process, particularly since what we know 
of the actual process engaged in by the White House prior to release of the 
FISA materials indicates that senior national security officials vigorously 
disagreed with approving the report’s release.123 
At best, then, the lifeboat lawyering account of the Carter Page FISA 
request’s release suggests that the lifeboat lawyering role entails significant 
triage.  By definition, we know that McGahn did not believe that President 
Trump’s decision to release the FISA materials was reason enough for 
McGahn to immediately resign his position.  McGahn may have thought that 
the FISA materials’ release would have benign effects of the kind described 
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above.  Perhaps McGahn felt that, by remaining in his job, he could head off 
other decisions with markedly less benign effects, such as September 2018’s 
thankfully aborted Russia probe document dump.124  That view brings us 
back to former President Obama’s warning that officials taking a lifeboat 
stance may facilitate a great many depredations, even as they head off a 
handful of catastrophes that go unnamed.125 
That process—if process is even the appropriate term—seems infected 
with the same mercurial lack of moorings that afflicts the Trump White 
House generally.  In a job in which past practice matters a great deal, 
oscillating between deference to and disregard for past practice can 
contribute to the undermining of institutions and norms.  Lifeboat lawyers 
should at least be clear about those long-term risks as they ply their 
precarious trade. 
CONCLUSION 
The birth of a new brand of executive branch lawyering is bigger news 
than the latest iteration of the iPhone.  The Trump administration’s lawyers 
have constructed a model of lifeboat lawyering to cope with the decisional 
vagaries of their restless client in the White House.  That new creation has 
relied on triage and improvisation to manage the mercurial turn of 
presidential decision-making. 
While lifeboat lawyering has its uses, we should be wary of its tendency 
to morph into insular lawyering’s disregard for institutions and unwritten 
norms.  McGahn’s letter, which approved release of Nunes’s memo, shows 
that practitioners of lifeboat lawyering may need to temper their heroic 
efforts with tolerance for their principal’s unwise or lawless decisions.  They 
may also overestimate their own worth in office and unduly discount the 
robust effect of a vocal resignation.  Under the circumstances, the toolkit for 
lifeboat lawyering should come with a stern warning:  handle with care. 
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